The Influence of Politics on Accountability of Health Professionals in Bangladesh: An Analysis of the Quality of Health Service Delivery by Islam, Mohammad Shafiqul
RESEARCH 
ARTICLE
The Influence of Politics on Accountability 
of Health Professionals in Bangladesh: 
An Analysis of the Quality of Health Service 
Delivery
M Islam
Mohammad Islam
Public Administration
Shahjalal University 
Sylhet 3114, Bangladesh.
Correspondence: 
shafig.pad@gmail.com
culture does not allow it. Moreover, elected officials 
have a limited administrative authority because of an 
inadequate decentralised health system that leads 
to poor accountability and inadequate healthcare 
delivery. Further, bureaucrats want to capture power 
and are unwilling to decentralise the health system. The 
policy recommendation includes the decentralisation 
of healthcare provision and increased participation of 
elected representatives in a decentralised system.
Abbreviations: ADP – Annual Development Plan; 
MP – Member of Parliament; NGO – Non Government 
Organisation; UHC – Upazilia Health Complex; 
UP – Upazilia Parishad.
Key words: politics; elected officials; decentralisation; 
accountability; quality of healthcare.
Abstract
This study explored the role and responsibility 
of elected officials including political actors and 
addressed the factors of politics, decentralisation, 
bureaucratic management, and political commitment 
to understanding accountability in health service 
delivery. This study used qualitative case studies for 
which a total of 68 in-depth interviews and five focus 
group discussions were conducted in two areas of 
rural and urban Bangladesh. The findings show that 
political actors have poor commitment to improving 
accountability and healthcare delivery. The elected 
officials are not interested in organising regular meet-
ings and they are even reluctant to organise a health 
service committee to make health officials accountable. 
The opposition political parties have no participation 
in health service organisations as the existing political 
Introduction
The quantitative indicators of maternal and child health in 
Bangladesh have improved significantly over the last several 
years. Data from the World Bank [1] show that the Maternal 
Mortality Ratio declined from 322 per 100,000 live births in 
2001 to 170 in 2013. Life expectancy at birth increased from 
45 years in 1970 to 70 years in 2013, and the Infant Mortality 
Rate declined from 94 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 33 in 
2013.
However, the quality of health service delivery is still 
inadequate. [2] Quality of healthcare is defined as the degree 
to which health services for individuals and populations 
is consistent with current professional knowledge and 
standards, and increases the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes. [3] A number of components enable patients 
to achieve desired health outcomes e.g., affordability, 
accessibility, efficiency, effectiveness and utilisation 
comprise quality health services. [4,5]
This study used maternal health as indicators to understand 
the influence of accountability on the quality of health 
service delivery, as the maternal health indicators have 
changed significantly during the last decade. Moreover, the 
health service organisations used as cases in this study are 
mainly maternal and child health as those services are very 
crucial to healthcare delivery in Bangladesh. In addition, no 
other studies based on maternal health services have been 
used for understanding accountability in Bangladesh.
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Demographics and health status
Health services are organised under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, a centralised and 
bureaucratic organisation, headed by a cabinet minister. This 
organisation is responsible for implementing, managing, 
coordinating and regulating health service delivery, 
which is divided into two branches – health services and 
family planning – administered by separate directorates. 
[6] Primary healthcare is not free, but requires only a very
small fee for service as defined under government pro-
visions. This healthcare is provided through a four-tiered 
system of government owned and staffed facilities at 
the union1 (lowest administrative unit) level all the way 
up to the central/regional level, [7] which is based on an 
administrative hierarchy. Locally elected officials are able 
to supervise health officials in improving health services; 
however they have no administrative authority to take 
action in implementing health services. The local health 
service bureaucracy, which is structured by hierarchy, is 
mainly responsible for implementing health activities.
The health service department at an upazila, the second 
lowest tier of regional administration, provides services 
through the upazila health complex (UHC). A UHC has 
under it union sub-centres and community clinics as the 
lowest tier of administrative unit (ward level). [8] Domiciliary 
services e.g., services at the patients’ homes, are provided 
through field staff from the Department of Health service 
organisations in order to make health services accessible 
to grassroots people. The upazila health administrator (that 
is, the upazila health and family planning officer) is mainly 
responsible for guiding health staff including field workers 
to promote the quality of healthcare. [8]
1Union Councils (or Union Parishads or Town Unions or Unions) are the 
smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh. 
(Khan, Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim. ‘Functioning of Local Government 
(Union Parishad): Legal and Practical Constraints’ Democracy Watch.
Figure 1: Administrative Hierarchy of the Health System in Bangladesh
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Organisations
Osman [9] states that sources of finance for the health 
sectors in Bangladesh consist of a combination of different 
elements, which include households, government revenue, 
donors and the community through non-government 
organisations (NGOs). Osman [9] also states that the 
majority of health expenditure comes from households, 
accounting for 45.6 per cent of the total health expenditure 
in Bangladesh in 2006. Of the remaining expenditure, 26.6 
per cent comes from government revenue, 25.8 per cent 
from external donors, and two per cent from community 
sources through NGOs. Osman [9] further states that a donor 
consortium2, led by the World Bank, provides financial and 
technical assistance on a continuous basis to the health 
sector of Bangladesh that could contribute to enhancing the 
governance of health service organisations.
Scarcity of skilled health professionals is one of the challenges 
of adequate facilities of health service organisations in 
Bangladesh. Rahman et al [10] argue that Bangladesh 
has a shortage of health service personnel with only 246 
physicians and 136 nurses per one million populations in 
2005. This means that there is one doctor for 4,065 people 
on average, and one nurse for 7,353 people on average in 
2005. In 2013, the ratio of physicians improved (1:3,297) but 
the nurse ratio decreased (1:11,696). [8] 
One of the criteria of improved service delivery of health 
service organisations is the amount of money allocated by 
the government. The government Annual Development 
Program (ADP) report shows that the government allocation 
to the health sector is relatively low in Bangladesh. [11] 
The effective delivery of services consists of efficiency of 
health professionals, sufficient allocation of budget, and 
the managerial efficiency of the organisation. With regard 
to allocation, the ADP report in Bangladesh states that 
US$560 03 million was allocated for the 2010-2011 financial 
year to improve health, nutrition, population and family 
planning and to assist in achieving the goals of health for 
all including the targets of the MDGs. This amount is the 
equivalent of 37.3 % of the total health budget and 5.68% 
of the total budget of the country in the same financial year. 
This percentage of the development budget in the health 
sector has increased slightly from 37.3% to 41% in 2012-13. 
[12] However, this amount is relatively small and inadequate 
to meet the necessary health goal of providing sufficient 
delivery of services. Data show that in 2006, the total health 
expenditure in Bangladesh was $14 per capita, compared 
to $29 per capita in India, and $57 per capita in Sri Lanka 
during the same period. [13]
Good governance can be assessed by specific standards, 
including: transparency, accountability, efficiency, effect-
iveness, fairness, participation, predictability and owner-
ship/engagement. [14,15] Adhering to high standards of 
governance by implementing accountability for health 
service organisations can enhance the quality of health 
service delivery. Accountability of healthcare organisations 
can be implemented through political oversight and 
regulation. This study has examined the responsibility 
of elected officials to assess the quality of health service 
delivery and to understand and implement accountability 
for healthcare organisations.
The current status of accountability in health service delivery 
in Bangladesh has been evaluated in a few studies. Nurunnabi 
and Islam [16] conducted a quantitative study assessing 
accountability among privatised healthcare services in 
Bangladesh. This study showed that 30% of the respondents 
expressed concerns or doubts about the implementation 
of accountability of administrators and managers. A similar 
percentage of respondents reported that waiting time to get 
an appointment for services was lengthy; potential causes 
included the observation that nepotism in hiring weakened 
the effectiveness of administration and management. 
Mahmud [17] demonstrated that decentralisation of 
management and services and democratic decision-making
contributed positively to community participation and 
the enhancement of quality healthcare. She also posits 
that decentralisation is perceived as a way to empower 
communities by engaging them in local level planning, 
resource mobilisation, and administrative and judicial 
authority. A study by Afsana [18] showed that laboratory 
tests and medications are not broadly available in many 
hospitals due to corruption and illegal private practice, 
consequently healthcare users have to spend extra money 
in order to obtain necessary assessments and treatments. 
Van [19] has examined three factors that can lead to 
corruption in healthcare delivery. These factors are: the lack 
of incentives and poor ethical tenets and values. Osman’s 
2 The Donor Consortium consists of international development organ-
isations that work towards improving governance and health service 
delivery for developing nations such as Bangladesh. These organisations 
work in different health sectors in Bangladesh. For example, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) supports child health, immunisation 
and nutrition programs; the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
support family planning service delivery and population education; the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) is the main international source of 
technical assistance in the field of health supporting primary healthcare 
and maternal and health services; and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) provides support for health planning capacities. [9]
The Influence of Politics on Accountability of Health Professionals in Bangladesh:  An Analysis of the Quality of Health Service Delivery
78 Asia Pacific Journal of Health Management 2017; 12: 1
[9] study suggests that managerial inefficiency is one of the 
causes, which contribute to inaccessibility of health facilities 
by unfairly distributing available healthcare resources and 
funding among rural and urban areas.
These studies have not identified and examined the role 
political actors and factors play in the implementation of 
health service delivery and the process of accountability. 
The objective of this study is to identify and examine the 
role elected officials in the delivery in health services and 
how politics contribute to or undermine accountability 
and quality of health service delivery. Local government 
elected officials should be responsible for supervising 
health professionals to promote quality healthcare delivery 
through ensuring accountability. Ensuring responsibility and 
providing authority may promote accountability; however 
authorisation of power through bureaucratic channels and 
the influence of politics over decision-making may limit 
health service accountability. This happens because of a lack 
of devolved power to locally elected officials. An assessment
of the understanding of political responsibility by politicians 
and administrative responsibility by healthcare providers 
and how their understanding contributes to the promotion 
of accountability and quality of care can be obtained 
through the use of interpretive qualitative research 
methods. This paper presents the impact of understanding 
by politicians and healthcare providers of the role of politics 
on accountability and healthcare quality.
Methodology
A total of 68 in-depth interviews and five focus group 
discussions were conducted in two areas both rural (the 
Chhatak sub-district) and urban (the Savar sub-district) 
areas in Bangladesh. These two areas were selected based 
on socio-economic status and the progress of maternal and 
child health3 in Bangladesh. This study was conducted using 
in-depth interviews from the national level respondents (-8), 
health professionals (-37), locally elected representatives 
(-7), and local informants (-16). In addition, five focus 
group discussions with a total of 39 respondents or service 
recipients were approached to collect input from service 
users in order to assess their understanding of how political
action contributes to accountability and the quality of 
health service delivery. 
Additionally, this study demonstrates a comparison of 
accountability and health service quality through examining 
the views of political actors of the two selected health service
organisations. Secondary sources of data from the 
literature reviews were used in this study for understanding 
accountability in health service delivery. This study is a part 
of the author’s Ph.D. project (Project no.5880), which was 
approved, by the Social and Behavioural Ethics Committee, 
Flinders University, Australia in 2012.
Results and discussion
Political responsibility and accountability in the delivery of 
high quality health services Political officials in this study 
stated that healthcare professionals are responsible and 
accountable for improving the quality of health service 
delivery. They also said that some of crucial political factors 
that affect the accountability of health service organisations 
(outlined Figure 2) include the items noted below. These 
factors have been analysed to better understand how 
political actions can contribute to accountability and the 
quality of health service delivery.
3 The Dhaka district (the Savar sub-district) has the lowest human 
poverty index (26.51%). Conversely, the Sunamganj district (the 
Chhatak sub district) has the highest human poverty index (39.44). [20] 
The Study by Sen and Ali [20] shows that the districts that have lower 
income poverty level, also tend to have a lower human poverty index, 
reduced child mortality and low fertility rates.
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Figure 2: Factors influencing political responsibility and their impact on accountability and quality of healthcare delivery
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The commitment of elected representatives
Elected officials can make commitments to expect and 
demand accountability from healthcare providers and to 
abolish or minimise corruption among health professionals
and organisations. Unfortunately, the leaders of their local 
political parties do not consider these issues and their 
impact on the quality of healthcare and their constituent 
population. Political candidates reportedly address 
healthcare improvements during election campaigns, but 
do not follow through with their promises after they are in 
office.
Though greater democratic governance has been witnessed 
in the past few years, no significant improvement has been 
noted in the areas of healthcare quality and accountability. 
Challenges identified include a lack of clarity about where 
the responsibility for this commitment should lie. For 
example, an elected representative of a rural health service 
organisation stated that the local Member of Parliament 
(MP) has expressed a commitment to enhancing the quality 
of health service delivery by promoting accountability. The 
local MP holds the highest position because his position is 
above that of secretary and the elected representatives at the 
local level work under the supervision of the MP. Therefore, 
he should take on this responsibility, a role designated for 
his position.
Similarly, the local elected representatives from the urban 
site argue that the MP likes organised meetings in order to 
highlight his name and promote economic development 
rather than focus on improvement of health service delivery. 
He is only perceived as being sincere when engaged in local 
activities, including when he visits hospitals to provide 
supervision. He is reported to recommend doctors for 
posting/transfer based on political influence or public 
complaints, but otherwise does not provide constructive 
suggestions to improve hospital environments.
Health Service Committee
The rural health service organisation has a health service 
committee under the supervision of local Member of 
Parliament (MP). This committee should play an important 
role in promoting high quality health service delivery, but 
the committee has no administrative authority to recruit 
doctors or transfer healthcare providers. The committee 
organises meetings occasionally, through each month, 
in which constructive discussion can identify issues and 
develop solutions to promote accountability and enhance 
quality in delivering health services. However, information 
from the rural UHC shows that this health services committee 
organised only two meetings in 2012.
Most elected officials are not willing to organise meetings to 
improve health service delivery as they have a very limited 
administrative authority to supervise health professionals. 
The provision of the existing local council does not allow 
elected representatives to supervise and monitor health 
officials as they are only able to play an observational role 
with health professionals. Elected officials are unable to 
execute public demands as they have limited authority. 
Scheduling regular meeting with a specific mission, and 
with identified goals, objectives, and agendas, allows the 
evaluation and identification of significant concerns and 
issues. A definition of criteria for accountability should be 
developed for local organisations, and periodic assessments 
should also be developed to evaluate compliance with 
implemented care standards and regulations.
An official source from the urban UHC argues that its upazila 
has a committee (Figure 3) in name only, but the committee 
was not functional for a long time. The local MP is required 
to establish the committee schedule, but the MP has no time 
to do so.
Therefore, a Health Service Committee is not functioning 
in urban health service organisations due to a lack of 
responsiveness by the MP, even though if falls in his job 
purview. However, the Upazila Parishad (UP) chairman 
conducts coordination meetings every month in which sub-
district level government officials, elected officials, NGOs, 
field level health workers, and local elites participate. [21] 
The coordination meeting acts as a guide for promoting 
accountability and ensuring quality of health service 
delivery.
Healthcare providers are formally accountable to their 
own department. Similarly, a UP member organises a ward 
meeting at the grassroots level to discuss the problems and 
prospects of health service delivery in addition to other 
local issues. Meetings at this level discuss the quality of 
antenatal services, the progress of immunisation, and the 
improvement of other maternal and child health issues. 
In fact, such meetings deal with the progress of health 
outcomes, but elected officials are unable to ensure the 
accountability of healthcare providers. One of the reasons 
for this is a lack of supervisory authority of field health 
service providers, which is discussed in the next section.
Supervisory authority of elected representatives
Involving elected representatives in overseeing the 
activities of health centres can be one of the ways to 
promote accountability and the quality of health service 
delivery, as the local elected representatives work very 
Figure 3: Committee of health service management of Savar and Chhatak upazila
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closely with healthcare providers. However, elected officials 
do not have the formal authority to supervise healthcare 
providers. For instance, the UP Chairman argued that the 
government should give sufficient authority to local elected 
representatives so that supervision can be improved to 
ensure the accountability of field healthcare providers. One 
of the mechanisms could be to require the health and family 
planning officials to report to elected representatives to 
ensure accountability. However, currently only the Health 
Department under which the health centre operates is 
administratively responsible for supervising the activities 
of the health centre. The Union Parishad or its Chairman 
is only able to observe their activities as they do not have 
the formal authority to supervise the activities of the health 
centre.
The local policy maker was disappointed with the physicians 
appointed ad hoc at the local community clinic and union 
sub-centre (USC), but does not have the authority to make 
necessary changes or hold the medical doctors accountable. 
He made efforts to make doctors accountable and keep 
them working in the hospital, but could not ensure their 
accountability as he has limited administrative authority 
to take necessary action (see Box 1.1). Local respondents 
in this study reported that the MP has taken action against 
mismanagement by doctors; as a result, doctors leave this 
hospital. Out of 20 doctors originally appointed to these 
facilities, only four doctors remain, limiting the patients’ 
access to services.
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Planning Officer
v
Government
Officials (4)
Local Elected
Representative (1)
Private
Officials (3)
Government
Officials (10)
Local Elected
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v
v
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v
v
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Box 1.1: inadequate supervisory power affects 
accountability
The local MP visited hospital, union sub centre and 
community clinic and noted the absence of doctors. 
Afterwards, he noticed the absentee and asked the 
reason of their absence. The MP also argues that it is not 
possible to ensure accountability of doctors providing 
excessive power to higher administration. The MP is the 
chairman of the health service committee but he cannot 
take action on mismanagement as he holds limited 
supervisory power. However, the minister can suspend, 
transfer and take necessary action because he has 
constitutional power. 
[Source: Interview with local policy maker]
Constructive politics
The nature of politics and the attributes of politicians have 
an impact on accountability and the quality of health service 
delivery. Politicians in office report avoiding healthcare 
responsibilities because they perceive them as being under 
the jurisdiction of the state government.
Opposition political parties have limited access to the 
activities of health organisations in both rural and urban 
v
v
v
v
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sub-districts, but they can bring attention to healthcare 
challenges and create awareness among the local politicians 
about the identified problems.
Unfortunately, most political parties have limited 
understanding of the issues and are not very interested in 
focusing on healthcare improvements. If the elected officials 
and opposition parties would collaborate to address these 
issues, society and the community would benefit.
The prevalent political culture is one of reasons for health 
professionals’ poor accountability. Doctors are involved in 
politics through a powerful organisation that is connected 
with national leadership. This political influence allows 
them to avoid accountability. For instance, the doctors’ 
association works as a powerful arm of the government and 
plays a significant role in changing health policy and doctor 
transfers.
Thus, the powerful leaders of doctor’s association pay 
little attention to an MP’s actions as they know the MP has 
insufficient power to take action against the mismanagement
of doctors and field staff.
Decentralised decision-making
Policy makers have understood that the centralisation of 
decision-making is a major problem for the health sector. 
Decentralisation can make health service delivery more 
effective, accountable and transparent. Decentralisation 
means that health system at the local level have to be 
accountable to the locally elected governing body.
Unfortunately, the health system is not decentralised; one 
of the reasons is lack of political will of the centralised 
democratic government. Centralised officials oppose 
decentralisation because they do not want to share power 
with locally elected representatives.
Local level hospitals can provide improved quality 
of healthcare through local planning and resource 
management. But local hospitals still depend on the central 
government for resource allocation and expenditure. The 
central authority is loath to share power with the local 
level, including resource allocation to local healthcare 
organisations. The upazila Health Service Committee can 
be strengthened through decentralising power to the local 
level such as authorising the upazila parishad chairman to 
be able to make decisions for quality improvement.
But local doctors do not want to report to elected officials, 
believing that they have a poor understanding of hospital 
administration. For example, on one occasion these 
officials were called ‘half educated or illiterate’. Doctors 
and healthcare professionals also fear that unqualified 
supervisors may interfere with the provision of healthcare 
and the doctor-patient relationship. Local officials will need 
to partner with expert doctors to develop guidelines and 
standards, and perhaps allocate the supervisor role to a 
qualified health professional and administrator.
Conclusion
The health system is not adequately decentralised, which 
reduces power of authority of elected representatives to 
fight against mismanagement and poor accountability. 
In addition, healthcare professionals are not willing to be 
accountable to elected officials, perceiving them to lack 
education and expertise and to easily succumb to political 
influence and corruption. Elected officials themselves have 
shown little commitment to promoting accountability and 
enhancing the quality of healthcare. Therefore, necessary 
authority should be designated at the sub-district and lower 
levels within local governments to promote accountability 
and quality in healthcare.
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